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On September 29, William J. McDonough, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
delivered the William Taylor Memorial Lecture in Washington, D.C., at an event cosponsored
by the William Taylor Memorial Fund and the Group of Thirty, a private, international 
consultative group on economic and monetary affairs. In his lecture, Mr. McDonough describes
the actions already taken by private and public sector groups to strengthen corporate 
governance and accounting standards and identifies areas where reforms are still needed.
I am honored this evening to be invited to deliver the
William Taylor Memorial Lecture. Bill Taylor was a
very special person. He was deeply committed to public
service and to the well-being of this nation’s financial
markets in his many years as head of Bank Supervision
at the Federal Reserve Board and as chairman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. For many of us,
he embodied the ideals of a central banker and a bank
supervisor: measured, professional, impartial, and
unstinting in his willingness to go the extra distance in
his search for the right answers to the problems he
needed to address. His years in the bank supervisory
community were cut all too short. We have sadly missed
the benefits of his wisdom.
This evening I would like to honor Bill’s memory by
talking about some issues I know would have been of
profound interest to him. Specifically, I would like to
focus my remarks on the elements that make for a sound
banking and financial system and the issues that have
been raised over this past year that have led many to
question the quality and integrity of the information
available to our markets.
Financial stability, as I have suggested on several
occasions, can be achieved only by the interaction of
three basic necessities: sound leadership at the firm
level, strong prudential regulation and supervision, 
and effective market discipline. These three elements 
provide the foundation for the health and soundness of
the financial system as a whole.
Sound leadership at the firm level is the first 
bulwark against financial system instability. It begins
with good corporate governance: capable and experi-
enced directors and management, a coherent strategy
and business plan, and clear lines of responsibility and
accountability.
The board of directors is meant to oversee the develop-
ment of the overall strategy of the organization and the
decisions made by senior management in pursuit of
those strategic objectives. This means that individuals
with skills and competencies consistent with the institu-
tion’s strategic focus must be represented. In addition,
the board should establish clear guidelines regarding
the independence of its directors. Senior management
is meant to set the business strategy, oversee day-to-
day decisions, and ensure that these decisions support
the long-term objectives and policies as determined by
the board.
To ensure financial stability, execution of the overall
objectives of the firm must be supported by rigorous
internal controls and effective risk management. An
effective internal control apparatus is critical to provide
reasonable assurance that the information produced 
by the organization is timely and reliable and that 
errors and irregularities are discovered and corrected
promptly. Such an apparatus is also needed to promote
the firm’s operational efficiency and to ensure compli-
ance with managerial policies, laws, regulations, and
sound fiduciary principles.
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Effective risk management is based on a foundation
of good corporate governance and rigorous internal
controls. Taking calculated risks is part of any business
enterprise. That is well understood. At the same time,
each firm needs to have in place the technical systems
and management processes necessary not only to iden-
tify the risks associated with its activities but also to
effectively measure, monitor, and control them.
An effective risk management and control structure
is not sufficient, however, if it is not accompanied by an
institutional culture that ensures that written policies
and procedures are actually translated into practice.
Ultimately, a firm’s culture is determined by the board
of directors and the senior management it installs. 
In particular, the actions of senior management and 
the consistency of their decisions and behavior with 
the values and principles they articulate are critical 
to shaping firm culture. It is vital that managers make
certain that their commitment to an environment that
includes effective risk management and rigorous con-
trols filters fully down the line to all employees in their
organization. 
Official regulation and supervision provide a second
line of defense against financial instability. Govern-
ments have long recognized that banking and other
financial institutions, because of the nature of the func-
tions they perform, must be subject to at least some
form of regulation and official oversight. Governments
have a broad mandate here. Their job is to ensure that
markets operate in a fair, transparent, and efficient
manner, and that participants comply with the rules of
the game. Governments must not rely on outdated
notions as to what constitutes risk and effective risk
management. Official supervision must evolve in line
with the way financial institutions manage their activi-
ties, which is increasingly across business lines rather
than across legal entities.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
which I chair, has developed principles for sound and
effective banking supervision and continues to add to
its guidance on minimum and advanced supervisory
practices. Its proposed revisions to the Basel Capital
Accord call for these principles to be applied to all
internationally active banks within a more dynamic,
risk-based, and process-oriented framework. The revi-
sions are intended to align regulatory capital require-
ments more closely with underlying risks and to provide
banks and their supervisors with a range of options for
the assessment of capital adequacy.
The third line of defense against financial instability
is effective market discipline, an increasingly important
ally of policymakers in a global marketplace. What do I
mean by market discipline? In my view, market partici-
pants, when armed with timely, meaningful, and accu-
rate information about a firm’s performance, can, by
their investment and credit decisions, encourage man-
agers and boards of directors to manage their risks
soundly. Equally important, market participants can
penalize firms that do not manage their risks soundly.
If market discipline is to be effective, however, it must
be supported by substantial and meaningful public disclo-
sure—as well as sound accounting standards and an effi-
cient and credible legal framework. Knowing a company’s
appetite for risk and its approach to, and methodologies
for, managing risk is essential to understanding the risks
of being a shareholder, a creditor, or a counterparty.
While significant progress has been made in recent
years in improving disclosure practices, it unfortunately
remains the case that many of these practices have sim-
ply not kept pace either with the rapid changes in many
firms’ business activities and risk exposures or with
how these exposures are measured and managed. For
this situation to be fully remedied, notions of what is
proprietary information and what should be in the 
public domain must change.
There can be no doubt about the need for dramatic
progress in improving disclosure practices. Clearly, a
full appreciation of risk cannot be achieved without 
sufficient information. This past year has made all too
clear that there is no greater enemy to financial stability
than a loss of confidence—and nothing undermines
confidence more than a lack of reliable information.
Discipline imposed by markets might not be pleasant,
but fuller, higher-quality information—in a word, trans-
parency—bolsters the confidence of depositors and
other creditors and thereby makes doing business easier
and more secure for everyone.
Progress on the disclosure front, however, will be
limited until accounting standards are enhanced to
ensure proper valuation and to reflect innovations over
the past decade, in terms of both new products and
modern risk management techniques. Accounting 
systems serve a variety of purposes, but none is more
important than helping creditors and investors make
rigorous and clear-eyed decisions as to which enter-
prises meet the market tests of efficiency, competitive-
ness, and profitability.
It is vital that managers make certain that their
commitment to an environment that includes
effective risk management and rigorous controls
filters fully down the line to all employees 
in their organization.Sound accounting systems also enable investors to
determine the value of enterprises. In so doing, the 
systems assist in attracting capital, both foreign and
domestic. In my view, therefore, ongoing efforts to
enhance and harmonize accounting standards world-
wide should continue and even intensify.
This past year brought widespread questioning of the
quality and integrity of the information available to the
market and the behavior of some corporate executives.
Although the developments that gave rise to this ques-
tioning are regrettable, there has, in fact, been a positive
side. The public uproar that these developments have
created and the turmoil they have generated in the finan-
cial markets have been immensely powerful as forces
for meaningful reform. I further believe that the painful
experiences of this year will help educate a generation
of younger managers about the importance of integrity
and sound corporate governance based on independent
oversight and strong internal checks and balances. 
The process of addressing these problems has clearly
begun. In this country, we already have on the table a
number of proposed changes from both private and
public sector participants. These initiatives reflect a 
tradition in our country of cooperation between the pri-
vate and public sectors that is a major reason for the
effectiveness, efficiency, and flexibility of our financial
markets. Let me touch briefly on what some of these
proposals and new measures entail.
On the private sector side, the New York Stock
Exchange approved a wide-ranging set of changes
which it submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in August. The proposed changes
include improved corporate governance standards as
well as related changes to certain other rules on its
books. For example, the New York Stock Exchange
would require all listed companies to have a majority of
independent directors as well as nominating/corporate
governance committees and compensation committees
composed entirely of independent directors.
The NASDAQ Board of Directors also approved 
a number of improvements in corporate governance
measures in May and July. Its proposals range from
requiring shareholder approval for the adoption of all
stock option plans to increasing and strengthening the
role of independent directors and the authority of audit
committees. 
The Business Roundtable, which represents the busi-
ness community, stands firmly behind the proposals 
of the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ to
improve listing requirements. The Conference Board
has endorsed reforms to stock option plans. Moreover,
the major rating agencies are committing more of 
their resources to analyzing the quality of financial
accounting and governance at the companies they
cover—efforts that will complement the private sector
reforms. 
The major initiative by the public sector has been 
the passage by Congress in July of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002. Although most of the new laws governing 
public companies are not immediately effective—and
many require implementing regulation by the SEC—
several provisions were put into effect right away. One
of these provisions required CEOs and CFOs to certify,
as of the second quarter of this year, that their quarterly
and annual reports fully comply with the reporting
requirements of the SEC Act of 1934 and that the
reports fairly present the financial condition and oper-
ating results of the firm. Included in the legislation are
criminal fines and imprisonment for false reporting.
These critical efforts at reform recall the private/
public sector cooperation that was so successful in the
preparations for the Y2K century date change. Experi-
ence has shown that such cooperation works best when
both sectors go beyond the need to solve the immediate
problem—that is, when they work together to learn from
past experience and to anticipate problems and thereby
strengthen the financial system on a longer run basis.
Why is this private/public sector cooperation so pro-
ductive? I would argue that it is because each sector has
its part to play. The private sector is motivated by self-
interest, the public sector by the public interest. In this
instance, private self-interest and the public interest
coincide: both have a stake in the healthy functioning of
the financial markets.
In a world of instantaneous communication, inter-
connected markets, and more complex instruments and
risks, effective cooperation between private and public
sector players is vitally important for financial stability,
both domestically and globally. At the same time, we
must be certain that our joint efforts to ensure the safe
and sound operation of our financial markets do not 
stifle the innovation and creative energy that are con-
stantly improving how financial markets operate and
the way firms do business.
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While significant progress has been made in
recent years in improving disclosure practices,
it unfortunately remains the case that many of
these practices have simply not kept pace . . .
with the rapid changes in many firms’
business activities and risk exposures.With these thoughts in mind, we must ask ourselves
how, by working together, we can best meet the chal-
lenges to our financial markets posed by the loss of
trust stemming from corporate governance breakdowns
and misleading accounting practices at some prominent
businesses. In answering this question, I am mindful of
a basic reality. Namely, despite the successes of previ-
ous private/public sector cooperative efforts, additional
issues that need our attention will always arise because
of the open and dynamic nature of our financial system.
As I noted, we have already begun to address some
of the causes for investor skepticism. Still, we have
much to do. I would like to comment on four broad
issues: corporate governance, executive compensation,
accounting, and disclosure.
Corporate Governance
Looking to the immediate future, I believe that one
challenge for directors and executive management is to
find outside directors who are sufficiently independent
but still knowledgeable about and engaged in the busi-
ness of the company on whose board they will sit.
Independence reflects qualities of objectivity, experi-
ence, insight, and force of character. The need for 
directors to possess this blend of knowledge plus 
independence is critical, given the increased technical
complexity of most business activities and the rapid
pace of change in financial markets and practices. 
Finding such outside directors can involve a tough
balancing act. Directors who are paid too little or who
are kept at the perimeter of the corporate structure may
be truly independent but have little incentive or insuffi-
cient knowledge about the organization to govern 
effectively. By contrast, directors who are paid well or
who are fully integrated into the corporate structure
may have the incentive and the knowledge to govern
effectively but lack the desired independence to disci-
pline incompetent or dishonest management.
The risk is that as outside directors’ compensation
increases, their independence may wane and, instead of
functioning as watchdogs for shareholders, they may
increasingly function as lapdogs for management.
Getting the right balance of expertise and independence
so that the board does not rubber-stamp the decisions of
top management is a major challenge.
Another challenge in selecting outside directors is
how to balance general business knowledge with spe-
cific industry knowledge and technical expertise in
areas such as accounting, finance, and labor markets.
Boards of directors clearly need individuals with a
broad range of expertise. But as business problems
evolve—and in large multinational corporations busi-
ness inevitably changes—the range of expertise needed
similarly evolves. Developing a well-rounded, appropri-
ately balanced board of directors is a tough assignment.
It is especially so considering that the shareholders 
who elect the board are generally a diffuse group with
little economic incentive or capability to monitor the
corporation closely—until, of course, something goes
terribly wrong.
Added to these challenges is the difficulty of finding
qualified directors who have the time to devote to the
affairs of the company and who are willing to face the
risk of shareholder lawsuits. Some qualified directors
may be reluctant to serve for fear that the potential bad
performance of the firm will damage their reputations.
The irony is that directors who are most qualified may
be the least willing to serve because of the opportunity
costs of the time they must spend and the potential
threat to their reputations.
Given what has transpired over this past year, there
may in fact be a need to reconceive the role of directors.
Some firms reportedly are already moving away from
the tradition of choosing the CEO of another company
as a director to choosing people who are equipped with
more specialized and technical knowledge. Still open,
however, are questions concerning how much time
directors should devote to their duties and what the
appropriate remuneration should be.
Executive Compensation
I have already publicly expressed my views on the trend
toward excessive executive compensation. As I argued
earlier this month, I can find nothing in economic 
theory to justify the levels of executive compensation
that are widely prevalent today. I believe that corrective
action—taken voluntarily—is not only overdue but also
morally sound.
This evening, I would like to focus on the effects of
public policy on executive compensation. As you know,
in 1993, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruled that
the maximum tax-deductible salary a company can pay
an employee is $1 million per year. Compensation
above $1 million has to be “performance-related” to be
considered a tax-deductible expense. This change in
public policy gave firms that wanted to minimize taxes
the incentive to introduce performance-related pay
structures for executives earning more than $1 million a
year. The policy change is a key reason that stock
options have become the most prevalent performance-
related structure for executive compensation.
Option-based executive compensation raises a num-
ber of issues. For example, one feature of the 1993 IRS
ruling is that the $1 million salary cap for tax deductibil-
ity is nominal and not indexed. This means that as the
average total compensation for executives rises over
time, the incentive to use stock options increases.
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are nontransferable. Therefore, an increasingly large
fraction of an executive’s compensation in the form 
of stock options represents a nondiversified risk.
Moreover, if the firm goes bankrupt, the options
become worthless at the same time that the executive’s
job is lost. As a result, firms may have to increase the
amount of options they offer an executive to offset the
increased riskiness of this form of compensation.
From my perspective, a more neutral tax policy
toward executive compensation would reduce the
reliance on stock options and not penalize firms if they
opted instead to use other forms of contingent-pay
mechanisms. A reconsideration of stock options is
already under way. Clearly, there is room for changing
the incentives that have been driven by tax policy. For
me, what is key is that firms have the flexibility to
structure new types of incentive compensation and that
public policy be responsive to these initiatives.
A deeper issue, in my view, relates to dividends. It is
true that dividend payout ratios—dividends divided 
by earnings—have fallen over time and have been
replaced by share repurchases, so that overall payout
ratios have remained remarkably flat. The periodic pay-
ment of dividends to shareholders represents a formal
corporate policy that is more precise and more visible
than share repurchase programs. The ability to make
dividend payouts is a barometer of cash flow. Dividend
payments and the consequent need for external finance
subject firms to market discipline. 
Currently, however, share repurchases offer certain
advantages over cash dividends from a tax perspective.
For one, capital gains taxes on share repurchases are
lower than income taxes on dividends. Second, with
share repurchases, investors can time their capital gains
or losses, whereas with dividends, investors cannot
choose when they will receive their taxable cash inflow. 
Regardless of any specific decision a firm may
decide to make, I strongly support more transparency in
financing and payouts, including share repurchase 
programs. In my view, public policy should aim to
eliminate distorting incentives and to encourage instead
the role of market discipline. Transparency is a neces-
sary ingredient for market discipline to be effective. 
Accounting
Accounting issues have gotten a lot of attention this
past year. It may be helpful to distinguish between the
business of accounting and the rules of accounting.
I would first like to discuss the business of accounting.
The accounting business has gone through a dy-
namic period of change over the past several years. 
A number of this country’s accounting firms were 
considering or had already begun the separation of 
their consulting business from their more traditional
accounting and auditing business well before this past
year’s turmoil.
In this process, accounting firms face a difficult
challenge. Once a firm has done a thorough job in its
accounting and auditing business, it is well positioned
to apply its firm-specific expertise to a consulting 
problem. However, accounting firms are no longer
allowed to provide accounting and consulting services
to the same organization. Thus, the challenge for
accounting firms is how to develop a business model
that will allow them to maintain some of their natural
economies of scope and at the same time avoid the con-
flicts of interest proscribed by law.
On a broader level, it seems to me that the account-
ing industry also faces important personnel issues. At
the Federal Reserve, experience has shown that super-
vising large, complex banks calls for supervisors with a
high level of technical expertise, the intellectual ability
to make difficult specific judgments based on general
principles, and the strength of character to remain open-
minded but steadfast in the face of pressure from the
management of supervised institutions. The accounting
industry needs to be certain it is attracting people with
these same attributes. 
As to accounting rules, one of the major issues today
concerns executive stock options, as I have noted.
Grants of stock options and the exercise of these grants
are, as we know, disclosed in the footnotes of a firm’s
reports, but this information typically is not accounted
for in the firm’s income statement or balance sheet.
Some might argue that as long as the information on
stock options is disclosed, exactly how the information
is accounted for is unimportant since disclosure in and
of itself is sufficient. In theory, this view may be justi-
fied. In practice, however, what we have found is that
information that is disclosed but remains off the
accounting statements is unlikely to be fully incorpo-
rated in the price of the stock.
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Another major issue with respect to accounting
rules—and there is some overlap with disclosure issues
here—concerns how intangible assets and complex
financial transactions are treated. Intangible assets are
generally thought to include a valuable trademark, a
renowned reputation, or an efficient process in deliver-
ing goods or services. Each of these intangible assets
has value, but this value can be lost in a heartbeat.
While it is true that a tangible asset such as a factory
can burn to the ground overnight, intangibles, unlike 
a factory, usually cannot be insured. A challenge to 
current accounting—and disclosure—rules, therefore,
is how to reflect accurately not only the value of intan-
gible assets, but also their vulnerabilities to sharp
downward revaluations. 
In terms of complex financial transactions, this past
year’s events have made clear that accounting and dis-
closure rules have failed to keep pace with financial
innovation. Complex financial arrangements, such 
as those funded offshore or through special-purpose
entities, are not effectively addressed in today’s account-
ing and disclosure rules. We have also seen telecom
equipment manufacturers run up billions of dollars’
worth of customer guarantees, which under current
accounting and disclosure guidelines do not have to be
recognized in financial accounts or disclosed to investors
until their customers default or are near default.
In these cases, it seems clear, one of the basic tenets
of accounting and disclosure rules—that there should
be no “hidden” liabilities—seems to have been violated.
I would like to see much more done to address these
deficiencies without unduly burdening the readers of
accounting statements.
Disclosure
Disclosure is most useful as a complement to account-
ing statements. The need for mandatory disclosures will
certainly continue, but firms should also be encour-
aged—and in some cases required—to make otherwise
nonmandatory disclosures if accounting statements are
misleading or incomplete. 
I would further argue that it is simply not enough 
for companies to disclose information. Investors also
have to pay attention to the information disclosed. A lot
of information underlying the proposed governance
reforms is already disclosed. For example, by reading
proxy statements, investors can make up their own
minds about such issues as whether the audit committee
members have sufficient financial expertise and how
many stock options executives have received.
What is clear is that the outstanding performance of
the U.S. economy over the past decade lulled investors
into a false sense of security. Recent events may, there-
fore, serve as a wake-up call—not only to management
that the market is watching them, but also to investors
and analysts to pay attention to the information already
disclosed.
While there have been many major improvements in
disclosure practices over the past several years, with
hindsight, I think that less progress was made than ini-
tially hoped and more could have been done. In short, 
I believe that there is a public policy need to rethink the
entire disclosure framework. 
In my remarks this evening, I have underscored a
number of issues that I believe merit immediate atten-
tion. Not one of these issues presents obstacles that 
cannot be addressed through the cooperative efforts of
private and public sector participants. There are cur-
rently more than 6,000 publicly traded companies in 
the United States. Only a handful of these companies
have been the object of concern this past year. 
At the end of the day, I have no doubt that the 
underlying depth and flexibility of the U.S. financial 
markets—combined with the heightened awareness 
of individual investors and the general public—will 
provide the necessary resilience to allow private and
public sector initiatives to take root. Through these
cooperative efforts, I believe that we will see an
even stronger financial system evolve. In this way, we
honor the memory of the man whose life we celebrate
this evening.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the
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